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Ifn his opening remarks to the Symposium which was the occasion for the
llcurrent consideration of the international-law constraints on computer network attack (CNA) ,1 Vice AdmiralA. K. Cebrowski, President ofthe US Naval
War College, asked the conferees, inter alia, to pay attention to the question,
"Does international law require us to wait until lives are lost or property damaged before we may engage in acts of self-defense?2 This is a question that has
troubled international decision-makers and legal scholars for centuries. It has
given rise to numerous and diverse opinions as to the proper threshold for the
moment at which a potential victim State may lawfully use armed force to protect itselfbefore the national border has been crossed, or the bombs have begun
to fall, or the missiles have been launched. Consideration of this subject has
given rise to a number of theories denominated by scholars and others variously
as "pre-emptive" strike, "anticipatory self-defense," "interceptive self-defense,"
and a variety of other terms. Determining the moment when a State may legally
take armed defensive action as a matter ofself-preservation is difficult enough in
the arena of conventional armed attack, where military and political intent may
be divined from concrete actions ofthe alleged aggressor State, such as mobilization of military and economic forces, movement of ground troops and/or air
and naval forces, and military exercises which may be regarded as rehearsals for
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armed action. But when an attack-i.e., computer network attack-can be initiated without warning and instantaneously by a few computer strokes or clicks
ofa mouse at a location remote from the target State,3 determining the threshold
criteria is even more difficult. Nevertheless, the harm to a target nation and its
infrastructure can be equally or more devastating than if kinetic forces were
used. The destruction or impairment of critical networks controlling such activities as domestic air control systems, electrical power systems and grids, national
banking systems, etc., even ifmilitary command and control networks are unaffected, could cripple a nation's economy and create a public health crisis ofimmense proportions.
While a leading expert in the field of network security who addressed the
symposium assured the participants that a successful penetration of secure systems was not as easy as some alarmists have made it out to be, 4 it is nevertheless
generally accepted that a skilled and persistent "hacker" could penetrate and seriously damage many critical infrastructures. Assuming even that such an impending attack could be predicted with reasonable certainty, an issue which will
be discussed at a later point in this chapter, the fact that the attack could be conducted by an individual or group that mayor may not be a part of the armed
forces or otherwise officially connected to a State, raises the additional questions
ofwhether such an attack can be attributed to the State in which the attack is initiated and whether such an attack is an "armed attack" within the accepted
meaning of that term. Or is it, in the nomenclature used by Professor Y oram
Dinstein, only an "unfriendly act" or an "ordinary breach ofinternational law, "5
which, under the widely accepted view, does not come within the prohibition
of a "threat or use offorce" as that term is used in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter?6 Categorization is particularly important in view of Article 51's
mandate that authorizes resort to the "inherent" right of self-defense only "if an
armed attack occurs against a Member ofihe United Nations."7
The principal paper on the subject of self-defense at the CNA Symposium
was given by Professor Dinstein and is published in this commentary under the
title, "Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense."8 As the moderator of a
small group of symposium participants designated to discuss this subject following the presentation of the paper, I was asked to prepare additional comments on
the subject. Rather than address all aspects of the doctrine ofself-defense against
computer network attack that were dealt with in Professor Dinstein's paper and
in the small group discussion, I shall primarily focus in this commentary on the
discussion which dealt with the issue raised by Admiral Cebrowski in his opening remarks-whether international law requires a State to wait until lives are
lost or property damaged before it responds in self-defense. Professor Dinstein
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answers this question in the negative by invoking a doctrine which he labels as
"interceptive self-defense."9 This subject provoked the most lively discussion in
the small group and revealed substantial differences of opinion among the conferees. In essence, they appeared to be expressions of two schools ofthought that
find support in the legal literature on this subject. The first of these supports the
"strict" interpretation of UN Charter Article 51, which would require that an
armed attack have actually taken place before a victim State may respond in
self-defense. Professor Dinstein's "interceptive self-defense" is a sub-set of this
school, giving it some flexibility ofinterpretation by allowing counter-action to
be taken in advance of the first blow being struck by an analysis of when the
armed attack actually begins, that is, when the potential aggressor "embarks
upon an irreversible course ofaction, thereby crossing the Rubicon. "10 The second school asserts that there exists an "inherent" right ofself-defense pre-dating
the Charter, which continues to exist alongside the law of the Charter, and permits, in some cases, "anticipatory" self-defense when an armed attack may not
have actually occurred but, according to objective evidence, is imminent.
'

The IIStrict'1 School
The intellectual foundation for a "strict" interpretation of Article 51 can be
found either in a narrow or literal reading of Article 51 as suggested by a
number of eminent authorities or in the interpretation elaborated by Professor
Dinstein in his book, War, Aggression and Self-Deftnce, that there was no
pre-existing law of self-defense prior to the adoption of the UN Charter, and
thus the law of self-defense as expressed in Article 51 is the sole legal basis for
exercising this right.
One of the earlier expressions of the narrow or literal reading of Article 51 is
found in an article by ProfessorJosefKunz, who stated in 1947 that:
[T]his right [of self-defense under Article 51] does not exist against any form of
aggression which does not constitute "armed attack." ... [T]his term means
something that has taken place. Art. 51 prohibits "preventive war." The "threat
of aggression" does not justify self-defense under Art. 51 .... The "imminent"
armed attack does not suffice under Art. 51. 11

Dr. Djura Nincic makes a similar argument, stating:
[N]othing less than an armed attack shall constitute an act-condition for the exercise
of the right of self-defense within the meaning of Article 51 .... It further
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stipulates that the armed attack must precede the exercise of the right ofse!f-deJellse, that
only an anned attack which has actually materialized, which has "occurred" shall
warrant a resort to self-defense. This clearly and e}.1'licitly rules out the
pennissibility ofany "anticipatory" exercise ofthe right ofself-defense, i.e., resort
to anned force "in anticipation" of an anned attack. 12

Other adherents of this view include Hans Kelsen,13 Louis Henkin,14 Ian
Brownlie,15 Hersch Lauterpacht,16 Andrew Martin,17 and Robert Tucker.1s
Professor Randelzhofer, who authored the Chapters on Articles 2(4) and 51 in
Simma's exhaustive exegesis on the UN Charter,19 also adopts, as the "prevailing view," the strict interpretation ascribed to the aforementioned scholars.2o
With respect to the specific question ofwhether a State has a right ofanticipatory
self-defense, he acknowledges that "[t]here is no consensus in international legal
doctrine over the point. "21 But he goes on to conclude that" Art. 51 has to be interpreted narrowly as containing a prohibition of anticipatory self-defence.
Self-defence is thus permissible only cifter the armed attack has already beell
launched. "22 His rationale for this conclusion is that since
the (alleged) imminence of an attack cannot usually be assessed by means of
objective criteria, any decision on this point would necessarily have to be left to
the discretion of the state concerned. The manifest risk of an abuse of that
discretion which thus emerges would de facto undennine the restriction to one
particular case of the right of self-defence.23

Professor Dinstein also adheres to the view that a literal interpretation ofArticle 51 is required, arguing, in essence, that a right of self-defense exists if, and
only if, an armed attack occurs. 24 He reaches that conclusion by a different route,
however. In War, Aggression and Self-Difence, he argues, in effect, that there was
no legally-recognized right of national self-defense prior to the adoption of the
UN Charter. In support of that view he states:
From the dawn ofintemationallaw, writers sought to apply this [domestic law]
concept [of self-defense] to inter-State relations, particularly in connection with
the just war doctrine .... But when the freedom to wage war was countenanced
without reservation (in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), concern
with the issue of self-defence was largely a metajuridical exercise. As long as
recourse to war was considered free for all, against all, for any reason on
earth-including territorial e}.1'ansion or even motives of prestige and
grandeur-States did not need a legal justification to commence hostilities. The
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plea ofself-defence was relevant to the legality of forcible measures short of war,
such as extra-territorial law enforcement .... Still, logically as well as legally, it
had no role to play in the international arena as regards the cardinal issue of war.
Up to the point of the prohibition of war [i.e., adoption of the UN Charter], to
most intents and purposes, "self-defence was not a legal concept but merely a
political excuse for the use of force. "25
Further developing this theme, Professor Dinstein argues that the right of
self-defense cannot be justified under either natural law or as an element of the
sovereignty of States. With respect to the natural law he states:
[A] reference to self-defence as a "natural right", or a right generated by "natural
law", is unwarranted. It may be conceived as an anachronistic residue from an era
in which international law was dominated by ecclesiastical doctrines. 26
With respect to reliance on the principle of sovereignty as a basis for an
"inherent" right of self-defense, he acknowledges that the series of identical
American notes accompanying the invitations to a number of States to become parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact lends some support to that theory.
Those notes stated, inter alia, that the right of self-defense "is inherent in every
sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty."27 Professor Dinstein states,
however, that:
[T]he principle of State sovereignty sheds no light on the theme of self-defence.
State sovereignty has a variable content, which depends on the stage of
development of the international legal order at any given moment. The best
index of the altered perception ofsovereignty is that, in the nineteenth (and early
twentieth) century, the liberty of every State to go to war as and when it pleased
was also considered "a right inherent in sovereignty itself' .... Notwithstanding
the abolition of this liberty in the last half-century, the sovereignty of States did
not crumble. The contemporary right to employ inter-State force in self-defence
is no more "inherent" in sovereignty than the discredited right to resort to force at
all times. 28
While it is clear from Professor Dinstein's analysis that he regards a State's
right of self-defense not to be activated until an armed attack actually occurs,
he avoids the catastrophic consequences that might result from such a rigid doctrine by walking back the time that an attack actually begins to the point where
the incipient attacker "embarks upon an irreversible course of action, thereby
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crossing the Rubicon. "29 He labels this as "interceptive" self-defense, which he
distinguishes from "anticipatory" self-defense in that it requires that the other
side "has committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way,"
rather than that the attack is merely "foreseeable."3o
While it is true that the self-defense doctrine owes its origin to theological and
natural-law sources, which were the foundations of the concept of the '~ust
war,"31 and while Professor Dinstein is undoubtedly correct that during the
positivist era of the 19th and early 20th centuries, any State was free to make war
as an element of sovereignty, States nonetheless often continued to plead
self-defense as a legal as well as a political or moral justification. This practice was
more than a vestigial remnant of ecclesiastical law. States regarded it as inherent
in their statehood; it is therefore not surprising that the term "inherent" found its
way into Article 51 of the Charter.
Although Professor Randelzhofer states that the literal or strict interpretation
ofArticle 51 with its denunciation of anticipatory self-defense is the "prevailing
view" among recognized scholars, he nevertheless admits that there is substantial
scholarly opinion contra. He states:
There is no consensus in international legal doctrine over the point in time from
which measures of self-defence against an armed attack may be taken. Thus, in
particular those authors who interpret Art. 51 as merely confirming the
pre-existing right of self-defence consider anticipatory measures of self-defence
to be admissible under the conditions set up by Webster in the Carolille case, i.e.
when "the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."32

The adherents of this opposing view are both numerous and distinguished. They
include, among others, such publicists as Oscar Schachter, Myres McDougal,
RobertJennings, Humphrey Waldock, and Antonio Cassese.
Sir Humphrey Waldock was one of the earliest critics of the highly restrictive
interpretation of Article 51 by the literalists. In his Hague lectures of 1952, Sir
Humphrey stated:
If an armed attack is imminent \vithin the strict doctrine of the Caroline, then it
would seem to bring the case within Article 51. To read Article 51 othenvise is
to protect the aggressor's right to the first stroke. To cut down the customary
right of self-defense beyond even the Carolille doctrine does not make sense in
times when the speed and power of weapons of attack has enormously
increased.33
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Professor Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano, focusing primarily on the
Kunz and Nincic readings of the Charter text, argue that the objections to such
readings are twofold. First, Kunz and Nincic attempt to interpret the meaning ofthe
tex1: from an analysis of the words alone, attempting to divine a single clear and unambiguous meaning, and Kunz, in addition," casually de-emphasize[s]" the preparatory work on the document. The second major flaw in their argument is that they
seriously underestimate the potentialities of modem military weapons systems and
the contemporary techniques of non-military coercion.34
With respect to arguments that allowing a State to respond in an anticipatory
manner would vest too much discretion in individual States, McDougal and
Feliciano point out that the claim to the right ofself-defense "remains subject to
the reviewing authority of the organized community."35
One of the more cogent criticisms of the conclusions reached by the literalists
was made by Professor David Linnan in a recent article in which he applied the
interpretive principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to an
interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter. He states:
Under the Vienna Convention, the te}..wal exegesis or ordinary meaning approach
enjoys primacy in the absence of inherent ambiguity or manifesdy absurd result.
Publicists employing the ordinary meaning approach, but dismissing Article 51's
inherent right-droit lIatllrel language as mere infelicitous drafting (viewing the
natural law approach as generally discredited) violate its most basic
canon. . . . [U]nder an ordinary meaning approach the use of the natural law
terminology indicates the adoption by reference of its scheme of self-defense
(,vithout reaching or e}..'Pressing an opinion on the validity of the natural law
approach itself, which is a national view of international law not shared by all
states). Regarding the scheme ofself-defense adopted, U.S. views expressed in the
notes accompanying the Kellogg-Briand Pact are representative. 36

Professor Linnan goes on to argue that if, however, the use of the term "inherent right" creates an ambiguity, it brings into play the secondary rule ofinterpretation, which authorizes resort to supplementary materials under Article 32
of the Vienna Convention, at which point the "legislative history" ofArticle 51
comes to the fore. As he and many other publicists have pointed out,37 the drafting history shows clearly that Article 51 was inserted to clarify the point that the
new Security Council system would not displace contemporaneous efforts involving the creation of regional security systems. 38
But international law is not just a creature of treaty text. It is at least equally a
product of State practice. Analyzing State practice since the adoption of the

127

Self~Defense

against Computer Network Attack

Charter, Sir RobertJennings and Sir Arthur Watts, while cautioning that anticipatory self-defense should be regarded as unlawful under most circumstances,
state that:
[I]t is not necessarily unlawful in all circumstances, the matter depending on the
facts of the situation including in particular the seriousness of the threat and the
degree to which pre-emptive action is really necessary and is the only way of
avoiding that serious threat. 39

Proceeding on that basis, they conclude:
The development of the law, particularly in the light of more recent state
practice, in the 150 years since the Caroline incident, suggests that action, even if
it involves the use of armed force and the violation of another state's territory,
can be justified as self-defence under international law where (a) an armed attack
is launched or is immediately threatened, against a state's territory or forces (and
probably its nationals); (b) there is an urgent necessity for defensive action
against that attack; (c) there is no practicable alternative to action in
self-defence ... ; (d) the action taken by way of self-defence is limited to what is
necessary to stop or prevent the infringement, i.e., to the needs of defence; and
(e) in the case of collective self-defence, the victim of an armed attack has
requested assistance. 40

The severe restraints that Jennings and Watts would apply to the exercise of
"anticipatory" self-defense reflect their concern that the right could be abused
with enormously serious consequences. Professor Rosalyn Higgins has expressed the same concern. She has contrasted two cases in which Israel asserted
this doctrine to justify resort to pre-emptive strikes to illustrate her view of
what mayor may not constitute a justified anticipatory exercise of the right of
self-defense. The first was the Six Days War of 1967. Recall the events leading
up to Israel's pre-emptory attack: President Nasser summarily ejected the UN
Emergency Force from Sinai and the Gaza strip; he closed the Straits ofTiran,
a vital seaway link for Israel to the outside world; both Syria and Egypt massed
troops on Israel's border; and Syria and Egypt unleashed a barrage of bellicose
statements. As Professor Higgins points out, neither the UN Security Council
nor the UN General Assembly condemned Israel's action. On the contrary,
there was a general feeling, "certainly shared by the Western states, that taken
in context, this was a lawful use of anticipatory self-defence."'!! The second
case was that of the Israeli air strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.
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There, the Security Council, with the concurrence of the United States and
the Common Market's "Group of Ten," "strongly condemn[ed}" Israel's actions. 42 Not only was the building of a nuclear reactor not a use of force; the
timing of the strike lacked the temporal element of urgency required by the
Caroline criteria. 43
Professor Cassese, in the same collection ofessays, agrees with Professor Higgins and, in addition, appears to go further by relaxing somewhat the rigorous
criteria of the Caroline case.
One might perhaps draw the conclusion that consensus is now emerging that
under Art. 51 anticipatory self-defence is allowed, but on the strict conditions that
(i) solid and consistent evidence exists that another country is about to engage on a
large-scale armed attack jeopardizing the very life of the target State and (ii) no
peaceful means of preventing such attack are available either because they would
certainly prove useless to the specific circumstances, or for lack oftime to resort to
them, or because they have been exhausted. 44
One of the most vocal critics of the strict interpretation theory has been the
late Professor McDougal. He urged that in the age ofthe ballistic missile, to postpone action in self-defense until after the "last irrevocable act" reduces the right
of self-defense to a right of retaliatory response.
It is precisely this probable effect that gives to the narrowly restnctlve
construction of Article 51, when appraised for future application, a strong air of
romanticism. 45
Professor Schachter has written on the subject ofself-defense on several occasions. While his writings reflect a profound commitment to the principles ofArticle 2(4) ofthe UN Charter, he nevertheless concludes that Article 51 cannot be
so narrowly construed as to require a State to forego the right to respond when,
based on persuasive evidence, an attack appears imminent. As he stated most eloquently in 1986:
On the level of principle, it makes sense to support a norm that opposes the
preemptive resort to force but acknowledges its necessity when an attack is so
immediate and massive as to make it absurd to demand that the target state await
the actual attack before taking defensive action. Webster's statement in the
Caroline case is probably the only acceptable formulation at the present time to
meet this situation. 46
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Finally, one must consider the judgment of the International Court ofJustice in the Nicaragua case, as well as Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion. In the
jurisdictional phase of the case, the United States had argued that its multilateral treaty reservation divested the court of jurisdiction since the customary
law of self-defense had been "subsumed" or "supervened" by treaty law, that
is, Article 51 of the Charter. At that stage, the Court, in refusing to dismiss the
case, stated:
The fact that the above-mentioned principles [including inter alia the principle of
self-defense] ... have been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does
not mean that they cease to exist and to apply as principles ofcustomary law, even
as regards countries that are parties to such conventions. 47

During the Merits stage, the Court further concluded that even if the customary
law and treaty principles were identical in content, the customary-law rule may
apply separately and independently.48 Since, however, the parties to the case
placed their reliance as to the applicability of the right ofself-defense only on the
case ofan armed attack which had already occurred, the issue of the lawfulness of
an armed response to an imminent threat of attack was not raised nor addressed
by the majority opinion. 49
Judge Schwebel, in his dissent, while also acknowledging that the issue was
not before the Court, and while recognizing that "the issue is controversial and
open to more than one substantial view," opined, ex abundi cautela, that he disagreed with a construction of Article 51 as if it read, "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right ofindividual or collective self-defence if,
and only if, an armed attack occurs."so
While the foregoing discussion admittedly constitutes only a partial review
of the many scholarly writings on the use of force and the right of self-defense,
I believe it constitutes a fair representation of the various positions taken by the
leading commentators who have addressed this issue. From this review it
would appear safe to conclude that there is a deep division between those who
argue for a literal interpretation of Article 51 and those who argue that such an
interpretation is inconsistent with the true meaning of the Article, particularly
in the post-nuclear age. To conclude that one view or the other is the "prevailing" view, as Randelzhofer has done, is, I believe, too strong a conclusion
to draw given the number and eminence of the scholars that are represented in
the opposing camp.
In view of the foregoing, I do not consider it to be unreasonable that the
United States takes the position that anticipatory self-defense against an
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imminent attack is pennitted under Article 51. This position is articulated in the
relevant military operational manuals and in the Joint ChiefS of Staff OCS)
Standing Rules of Engagement. The Navy's Manual, for example, provides as
follows:
Anticipatory Self-Defense. Included within the inherent right of self-defense is
the right ofa nation (and its anned forces) to protect itself from imminent attack.
International law recognizes that it would be contrary to the purposes of the
United Nations Charter if a threatened nation were required to absorb an
aggressor's initial and potentially crippling first strike before taking those military
measures necessary to thwart an imminent attack. Anticipatory self-difellSe involves
the lise ofanlledforce where attack is imminellt and no reasonable choice ofpeaciflll means is
available. 51

The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement authorize the exercise of the right
of anticipatory self-defense against forces displaying "hostile intent," which is
defined, inter alia, as follows:
Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States,
US forces, and in some circumstances, US nationals, their property, US
commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and
their property.52

Having concluded that it would not be unreasonable for a State to take the
position that anticipatory self-defense against an imminent armed attack is lawful, and having found that the United States has adopted this position, the question remains as to what are the criteria for detennining when an attack is
"imminent." The classic formulation is US Secretary of State Daniel Webster's
dictum that an armed response is lawful when the necessity of action is "instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. "53 This is the test adopted by many eminent scholars and has been repeated
often in legal and diplomatic arguments. It was adopted in the US Navy's operational manual prior to its current iteration. 54 A number of scholars have concluded, however, that this articulation is much too restrictive in the present age,
particularly in the light of the possibility of devastating nuclear attack.
McDougal and Feliciano have stated, for example, that:
[T]he standard of required necessity has been habitually cast in language so
abstractly restrictive as almost, if read literally, to impose paralysis. 55
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In their own extensive analysis of the required degree of necessity, McDougal
and Feliciano are unable to provide tests that are less abstract, finally concluding
that the requirement of necessity "can only be subjected to that most
comprehensive and fundamental test of all law, reasonableness in particular
context."56 Analyzing the particular context of the Cuban Missile Crisis of1962,
Professor McDougal concluded that the US quarantine of Cuba was a lawful
application of the doctrine of self-defense. 57 Central to his analysis was that the
United States' action was an exercise of "initial discretion," which was then
Qacked up by mustering the support of the members of the Organization of
American States and reporting its action to the Security Council. 58
Sally and Thomas Mallison have analyzed the criteria for the lawful employment of self-defense against an imminent armed attack in several of their writings, mostrecendyin volume 64 of the Naval War College's "Blue Book" series
(1991), where they, like McDougal and Feliciano, concluded that the Webster
formulation was too restrictive, "since a credible threat may be imminent ,vithout being 'instant' and more than a 'moment for deliberation' is required to
make a lawful choice of means."59 Like McDougal and Feliciano, they also assert that whether an anticipatory resort to armed force in self-defense is lawful
can only be determined in the context of the facts of the specific case. 60 They
emphasize that where anticipatory self-defense is claimed, the criteria for lawfulness must be applied with greater stringency than when an actual attack has
occurred. 61

Computer Network AHacks as IIArmed AHacks"
It is important that what is under discussion here is not what may be lawful in
an ongoing armed conflict (jus in bello) but rather actions by a hostile individual,
group, or State against another State while the target State and the State of origin
of the actions are not yet engaged in armed conflict (jus ad bellum). In an ongoing
armed conflict (war), it is unquestionably legitimate for a State to attack its enemy's military telecommunications infrastructure, including military computer
networks. 62 Attacks on other telecommunications and network facilities which
serve both military and civilian clientele may also be legitimate military objectives, provided that the international humanitarian law of armed conflict is observed with respect to proportionality, including limiting collateral damage. 63 It
is a matter ofindifference whether the mode ofattack is kinetic or electronic, although the former may be more objectionable since it is more destructive and
may cause more long-lasting effects.
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In examining whether a computer network "attack" may constitute an
"armed attack," Article 51 cannot be construed in isolation but rather must be
read in the context of other articles of the Charter, particularly Articles 2(4), 39,
41 and 42. Article 2(4) provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political indepen"Ience of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Article 39 empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of "any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to make
recommendations or decide on "measures" to be employed under Article 41 or
Article 42. Article 41 provides a non-exhaustive list of measures "not involving
the use of armed force" which the Security Council may take including
"complete or partial interruption of ... telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication." Article 42, in tum, provides for actions "by air, sea, or land
forces" when the measures provided for in Article 41 are inadequate. Since the
actions in Article 41 are described as "measures not involving the use of armed
force, "64 whereas those in Article 42 involve the use of armed forces, it would
appear that, at least as an initial presumption, a computer network attack would
not be regarded as an "armed attack." Giving effect to such an initial
presumption, however, ignores the significance of the drastic consequences that
such an attack can have on the social, economic and military structure of a State.
As will be discussed infra, whether an attack is to be considered as an armed attack
depends on the consequences of the attack rather than the modality.
The various terms used in the Charter, including the Preamble-"war" (preamble), "armed force" (preamble), "acts of aggression" (Article 1), "threat or
use offorce" (Article 2(4», "act of aggression (Article 39), and "armed attack"
(Article 51 )-differ in scope and content. Though related in content "they differ
considerably in their meaning."65 None of them is further explained in the
Charter.
This lack of definition has led to several attempts, primarily by the General
Assembly, to give further content to the terms, particularly "act of aggression."
Article 3 ofthe 1974 General Assembly's "Definition ofAggression" Resolution
provides the following non-exhaustive list of acts which qualify as acts of
aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces ofa State of the territory ofanother
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such
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invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use offorce ofthe territory ofanother
State or part thereof;

(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State or the use ofany weapons by a State against the territory ofanother State;
(c) The blockade ofthe pprts or coasts ofa State by the armed forces ofanother State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces ofa State ofthe land, sea or air forces, marine and
air fleets of another State;
(e) The use ofarmed forces ofone State, which are within the territory ofanother
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in
such territory beyond the tennination of the agreement;

(f) The action ofa State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal
ofanother State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act ofaggression
against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein. 66

While the term "act ofaggression" is broader than "armed attack," it is apparent that most of the acts listed in the General Assembly's resolution would also
constitute an "armed attack" and would, if of sufficient scale and effect, invoke
the victim's right to respond under its right of self-defense.
As several recent articles and monographs have revealed, analyzing the novel
and still-developing concept of computer network attack under either the customary law ofself-defense or Article 51 of the Charter presents both theoretical
and practical difficulties. 67 The principal difficulty flows from the fact that both
traditionally and under the Charter, the discussion and codification ofwhat constitutes an act of aggression or an armed attack generally involve the use of
armed force-either in the form of employment of military weapons or hostile acts by members of the armed forces. It is now clear that the "armed
force" involved does not have to be a part of the organized military forces ofa
State. As indicated above, the General Assembly's "Definition of Aggression"
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Resolution, after listing certain acts involving the "anned forces ofa State," also
includes, as an act ofaggression, the sending by or on behalf of a State of"anned
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of anned force
against another State" or the substantial involvement of a State in such actions
provided they reach a certain level of gravity.68 The judgment of the International Court ofJustice in the Nicaragua case likewise held that the "arming and
training of the contras [by the United States] can certainly be said to involve the
threat or use offorce against Nicaragua. "69 It also held, however, that the "mere
supply of funds ... does not in itself amount to a use of force. "70
Those publicists who have grappled with the problem ofdetermining when a
computer network attack constitutes an anned attack, have two possible avenues ofapproach-either the instrumentality or the consequences test. Nearly 40
years ago, Professor McDougal and Mr. Feliciano, though not visualizing cyber
warfare, were critical of focusing on the instrumentality as the "precipitating
event" for lawful self-defense, stating that to do so
is in effect to suppose that in no possible context can applications ofnonmilitary types
of coercion (where anned force is kept to a background role) take on efficacy,

intensity, and proportions comparable to those ofan "anned attack" and thus present
an analogous condition ofnecessity. Apart from the extreme difficulty ofestablishing
realistic factual bases for that supposition, the conclusion places too great a strain upon
the single secondary factor of modality-military violence.71

Michael Schmitt points out, however, that:
At least since the promulgation of the Charter, [the] use of force paradigm has
been instrument-based; determination of whether or not the standard has been
breached depends on the type of the coercive illstrnmellt-diplomatic, economic,
or military-selected to attain the national objectives in question. The first two
type ofinstruments might rise to the level ofintervention, but they do not engage
the normatively more flagrant act of using force. 72

While admitting that an instrument-based approach provides a relatively
easily-applied test for calculating lawfulness of an act of intervention,73 he
ultimately concludes that it does not provide a useful test for computer
network attack.
Computer network attack challenges the prevailing paradigm, for its
consequences cannot easily be placed in a particular area along the community
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values threat continuum. The dilenuna lies in the fact that CNA spans the
spectrum of consequentiality. Its effects freely range from mere inconvenience
(e.g., shutting an academic network temporarily) to physical destruction (e.g., as
in creating a hanunering phenomenon in oil pipelines so as to cause them to
burst) to death (e.g., shutting down power to a hospital with no back-up
generators). It can affect economic, social, mental, and physical well-being,
either direcdy or indirecdy, and its potential scope grows almost daily, being
capable of targeting everything from individual persons or objects to entire
societies.74

Professor Schmitt recognizes, however, the weakness of a system of analysis
which attempts to apply a system developed to regulate kinetic activities to account for non-kinetically based harm.7 5 He calls for a new normative architecture.7 6 Recognizing also, however, that there is no current consensus as to the
need for developing such an architecture, he articulates an "appropriate normative framework"77 under current intemationallaw as framed within the UN
Charter, that relies on the "consequences" theory.
To constitute an anned attack, the CNA must be intended to direcdy cause
physical damage to tangible objects or injury to human beings. . .. States, acting
individually or collectively, may respond to a CNA amounting to anned attack
with the use of force pursuant to Article 51 and the inherent right of
self-defense.78

The Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University has also adopted a "consequences" test as to whether a CNA rises to the level
of an armed attack, stating:
[I]t appears likely that an "anned attack" would include some level of actual or
potential physical destruction, combined with some level of intrusion into its
target's borders, or violation of its sovereign rights. . .. [A]ttacks that are
sufficiendy destructive may qualify as "anned attacks," no matter what their level
of intrusion, and vice versa.7 9

Likewise, Professor Dinstein adopts a consequences test. He offers as examples of
CNAs that would constitute armed attacks the following:
Fatalities caused by loss ofcomputer-controlled life-support systems; an extensive
power grid outage (electricity blackout) creating considerable deleterious
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repercussions; a shutdown of computers controlling waterworks and dams,
generating thereby floods of inhabited areas; deadly crashes deliberately
engineered (e.g., through misinformation fed into aircraft computers), etc. The
most egregious case is the wanton instigation ofa core-meltdown ofa reactor in a
nuclear plant, leading to the release of radioactive materials that can cause
countless casualties if the neighboring areas are densely populated. In all these
cases, the CNA would be deemed an armed attack. 80

Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., would lower the threshold substantially.
[T]he mere penetration by a state into sensitive computer systems such as early
warning or command and control systems, missile defense computer systems, and
other computers that maintain the safety and reliability of a nuclear stockpile,
should by their very nature be presumed a demonstration of hostile intent.
Individually, these computer systems are so important to a state's ability to defend
itself that espionage into anyone of them should be presumed to demonstrate
hostile intent. 81

It is to be recalled that under the ]CS Standing Rules of Engagement,
demonstration of a hostile intent is the determinant for permitting an armed
response to an imminent armed attack. 82 Invoking such a low threshold" for
triggering the right to respond by armed force in self-defense seems to be
establishing a dangerous standard, especially when it is often difficult to
determine whether a computer network attack has occurred at all. In some
instances, malfunctions which appear at first to be the result of computer
network attack have been determined, after more thorough investigation, to be
the result of faulty software or operator error. 83
If one agrees that computer network attacks of some degree of severity and
under some circumstances may constitute "armed attacks," then one must apply some criteria for determining when such attacks cross the threshold from
interventions that do not warrant responses under the right of self-defense to
those that do. As has been mentioned, the closest the UN Charter itself comes
to describing anything remotely resembling CNA is in Article 41, where it
lists "complete or partial interruption . . . of telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication" as a measure "not involving the use of armed
force" which the Security Council may take against threats to the peace,
breaches of peace, or acts of aggression. 84 Presumptively, computer networks
would fall under a broad definition of "telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication," but in today's environment of almost total dependence on
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the proper functioning of computer networks for control of vital societal
functions, as well as critical national-security systems, the "complete or partial
interruption" of such systems would have a much more drastic effect than
anything that could have been envisaged by the framers of the Charter in
1945. Article 41, therefore, cannot be said to require the categorization of
computer network attacks as actions "not involving the use of armed force."
As Professor Schmitt has suggested, it would be desirable for a normative
architecture specifically tailored to CNA to emerge. For the present, however, until a consensus develops for the need for a new normative architecture, it would appear that the most rational and practical test of whether a
computer attack can be the precipitating event for the exercise of lawful
self-defense is whether the consequences are major damage to or destruction
of vital military or civilian infrastructures or the loss of human life.

Anticipatory Self-Defense against Computer Network AHack
As discussed earlier, there is substantial legal support for the proposition that
where there is persuasive evidence that an armed attack is imminent, the potential victim State is not required to stand idly by until the actual attack has
occurred-it may respond with proportional force to ward off the attack. The
difficulty with the application ofthis principle is in determining that in fact an attack is imminent. In the case of an attack by kinetic means, there are usually (but
certainly not always) intimations ofan impending attack. Some may be ambiguous, such as a step-up in propaganda or bellicose statements; others may carry a
clearer threat-movement of troops to the border, mobilization of forces,
increased aerial and electronic surveillance, deployment of naval and air forces,
and clandestine in:filtration ofintelligence agents. While a computer network attack may also be preceded by acts that suggest an attack is imminent (or it may itself be a part of the pre-attack build-up for an attack by kinetic means), the
capability ofan attacker to cause almost instantaneous harm suggests that the first
notice that a victim State may have that a computer network attack is underway
is to experience the harmful effects themselves. If the consequence of the CNA
is serious harm to vital infrastructure or loss ofhuman life, then under the principles previously discussed, a proportional response is lawful. But difficult questions remain. Response against whom? Can the attacker be identified? The
originator of the attack may have sent his electronic attack through multiple
switches and servers in several different countries. Is the attacker acting on behalf
of a foreign government, or is he merely a teen-age "hacker" engaged in what is
to him a prank?85 If the hacker is not a direct agent of a foreign government, is
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the foreign government aware of his actions and impliedly consenting to them?
The permutations and combinations of situations under which attacks may occur number in the millions. Professor Schmitt has reported that today over 120
countries are in the process of establishing information warfare competence86
and by the year 2002 some "nineteen million individuals will have the
know-how to launch cyber attacks."87
Obviously, not every probing of a presumably secure network, whether
one controlling vital civilian infrastructure or a military network controlling
critical defense functions, such as air defense, atomic weapons, satellite communications, or intelligence gathering, can be considered as a prelude to a
full-scale network attack. Professor Schmitt has reported that the Defense
Information Systems Agency identified 53 attacks on defense systems in
1992.88 By 1995 the number had increased to 559 and was expected to reach
14,000 in 1999.89 Figures supplied by the Defense Information Systems
Agency reports are even more unsettling. That agency reported that the Defense Department may have experienced as many as 250,000 attacks in
1994.90 Although each of these "attacks" required investigation and appropriate action, none of them presumably were of sufficient gravity either to indicate that they were themselves an "armed attack" that would have authorized
a resort to armed force in response nor were they regarded as indicators that
such an armed attack was imminent.
It would seem, then, that the most likely application of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to computer network attacks would be in the case of
such attacks that in and of themselves do not constitute an armed attack but
rather are evaluated as precursors of an armed attack by kinetic means and/or
further, more severe cyber attacks. In modem warfare, the electronic batdefield will playa crucial role, and any steps that a prospective attacker can take to
neutralize or destroy its enemy's electronic command and control, intelligence, communications, or weapons-control networks prior to a kinetic attack
would gain enormous advantage. While these preliminary CNAs may not
themselves rise to the level of armed attack, they may, if combined with other
evidence of an impending attack, be sufficient to authorize armed measures of
self-defense-not against the CNAs themselves, but rather as an exercise of the
right of anticipatory self-defense against the impending kinetic or more serious
cyber attack.
Professor Schmitt, who also visualizes the most likely scenario to be the use
of CNA to soften up the batdespace,91 proposes a three-prong test for determining when a State may respond to a CNA that itself does not constitute an
armed attack.
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1. The CNA is part of an overall operation culminating in anned attack;

2. The CNA is an irrevocable step in an imminent (near-tenn) and probably
unavoidable attack; and
3. The defender is reacting in advance of the attack itself during the last possible
window of opportunity available to effectively counter the attack. 92

This formulation appears to be an application of Secretary Webster's dictum
in the Caroline case, adapted to computer network attack. As we have seen, the
Caroline standard has been found by many publicists to be too narrowly drawn to
apply in all circumstances. "The last possible window" may be too late to avoid
catastrophic results. The problem does not lend itself to a specific formula. I suggest that whatever the formula used, in the final analysis, the decision maker
must apply "that most comprehensive and fundamental test of all law, reasonableness in particular context. "93

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have attempted to defend the proposition that a State's right
to exercise its "inherent" right ofself-defense by armed force is not limited to the
situation in which an attack has actually occurred, but may also apply when a
State has persuasive evidence that such an attack is imminent (anticipatory
self-defense). The State exercising the right ofanticipatory self-defense, however,
bears a heavy burden ofproof that the evidence upon which it acted was indeed
persuasive and must withstand ex post facto examination by the international
community, primarily through the Security Council. I have also attempted to
demonstrate that the term "armed attack" may also include attacks upon computer networks solely by electronic means if the consequences of such attacks include either substantial harm to vital civil or military networks, or loss of human
life, or both. Although the first of these propositions is admittedly controversial,
and some have labeled it a minority view, I believe that there is distinguished
scholarly support for that position, as well as substantial support in State practice.
The adoption of this position by the United States, as reflected in its military
manuals and Standing Rules of Engagement is therefore justifiable. As to the
second proposition, that is, that the test of whether an action constitutes an
armed attack is the consequence of the attack, there does not seem to be any
other choice, since an instrumentality-based criterion is wholly impractical in
view of the capability of an innocuous instrument-the computer-to become
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a lethal weapon in the hands of a skilled and persistent "hacker" determined to
invade and attack another's computer network.
When I attempt to apply the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to computer network attack, I find myself in waters difficult to navigate. The most
likely scenario for CNA is that it will occur suddenly, without warning. It also
seems likely that a true hostile CNA reaching the level of an "armed attack"
will not be an isolated incident, but rather will occur as part of the preliminary
softening-up of the battlespace preceding an attack by kinetic weapons or a
more serious cyber attack. Professor Schmitt apparently visualizes this same scenario since he shifts the focus of his section on anticipatory self-defense to use of
"computer network attack operations executed to prepare the battlespace."94
Under these circumstances, it becomes even more important for a State facing
what may appear to be an imminent CNA carefully to utilize all its resources in
its analysis ofall the surrounding events, political and military, to aid in its determination ofwhether an armed response may be made under the right ofself-defense. Only in this way can it meet its heavy burden of establishing the
justification for initiating the first resort to the use of armed force.
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